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The treatment of housing in the deﬁnition of income used to measure poverty makes
a big difference to who is counted as poor. Both the Before Housing Costs (BHC) and
After Housing Costs (AHC) measures in current use in the UK pose problems. BHC
income does not capture the advantages of living in owner-occupied housing and AHC
income might not account for the beneﬁts of living in higher-quality accommodation.
We explore the potential of including in income the difference between the estimated
value of housing consumed and housing costs, which we refer to as net imputed rent. We
investigate whether ﬁndings about child and pensioner poverty, and judgements about
the effectiveness of poverty-reducing policies, are affected by accounting for housing in
this way.
I n t roduct ion
Who is counted as poor (e.g. with income falling below a threshold) depends crucially
on the measure of income adopted. One aspect of the measure of income that has drawn
particular attention in the UK is the treatment of housing costs. As well as the physical
standard of housing itself being important in avoiding deprivation, the affordability of
housing costs is a major factor that impacts on the standard of living (Atkinson et al.,
2002). Recognising that the cost of housing does not always match the physical standards,
official UK Households Below Average Income (HBAI) statistics present two alternative
measures of income: ‘Before Housing Costs’ and ‘After Housing Costs’ (DWP, 2009).
Before Housing Costs (BHC) income is the measure generally adopted for poverty
analysis in the countries of the European Union. It includes cash housing benefits and
does not deduct housing costs, treating housing as any other consumption good. However,
variation in the housing costs paid by households with comparable physical standards of
housing may arise simply as a result of living in a particular region or being at a particular
stage of mortgage repayment (Johnson and Webb, 1992; Buck et al., 2007); or across
households with different housing tenures. For example, social tenants benefit from a
subsidised rent (Sefton, 2002) that the BHC measure of income does not acknowledge.
Furthermore, owner-occupiers who own outright or who have paid off some of their
mortgage might benefit from paying lower housing costs on a regular basis, compared to
the situation of a comparable property rented in the private market.
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To address this, after housing costs (AHC) income is sometimes calculated, which
is BHC income less housing costs (e.g. DWP, 2009). In deducting housing costs from
income, the issues raised above are dealt with. However, the fact that households occupy
dwellings of different quality, affecting their relative standards of living, is ignored. The
AHC measure understates the relative standard of living of those enjoying better housing
either through choice or good fortune.
To overcome the drawbacks of the BHC andAHCmeasures, we propose an alternative
measure of income that aims to account for both the housing costs paid for a given
housing quality, and the housing quality. We refer to this as the imputed rent (IR) income
measure. In brief, the housing price-to-quality relationship observed in the private rental
market is used to impute a value for housing consumption, based on each dwelling
characteristics, but consistently across all tenure types. From such value the housing costs
actually incurred are deducted. This measure of net imputed rent is then added to BHC
income to obtain the IR income.
IR constitutes a large component of in-kind income in most European countries (Frick
et al., 2008). Contributions in the literature have offered empirical evidence of a strong
inequality-reducing impact of IR both in EU counties (Smeeding et al., 1993; Eurostat,
1998; Frick and Grabka, 2003; Frick et al., 2007) and elsewhere in the world (Yates, 1994;
Buckley and Gurenko, 1997; Gasparini and Escudero, 2004).
This article demonstrates and quantifies the difference an IR income measure makes
to poverty measurement for the UK, drawing on the methods and approaches from the
international literature. In particular, it provides an illustration of how including IR in
income measurement can change conclusions about the relative effectiveness of anti-
poverty policy reforms.
Given recent UK policy attention, we focus on children and pensioners. According
to official statistics, the risk of experiencing poverty is significantly higher for children and
pensioners than it is for the working age population using the BHC measure, and also for
children using the AHC measure (DWP, 2009). We explore whether this remains the case
using the IR measure. Furthermore, we examine how conclusions about the effectiveness
of stylised poverty-reducing policies, targeted at children and pensioners are affected by
the adoption of the IR income measure.
Pover ty ana lys i s : methods and income measurement
We use the Family Resources Survey 2003–4 (FRS), with a sample of 28,860 private
households, for our analyses. The FRS provides information about individual income
from various sources, tenure type, housing characteristics and housing costs. In order for
all our empirical results to be consistent with each other, we use incomes as simulated
by POLIMOD, a tax-benefit model for the UK (Redmond et al., 1998), rather than using
incomes as recorded in the FRS. We can, therefore, compare the incomes following
simulated policy reforms with the incomes prevailing under 2003–04 policies. The
POLIMOD simulated incomes have been defined to be as similar as possible to those used
in the HBAI statistics (DWP, 2009), both BHC and AHC. POLIMOD calculates liabilities
for income tax and National Insurance contributions and entitlements to child benefit,
tax credits and means-tested benefits, including housing benefit. Otherwise, elements of
income and housing costs (with rent measured gross of housing benefit) are drawn from the
recorded values in the FRS dataset. Adjustments for non take-up of means-tested benefits
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Table 1 Housing tenure distribution in the United Kingdom
Sample numbers
Proportion of people (weighted) (per cent)
(households) Population Children Pensioners
Own outright 8,857 25.4 8.8 67.7
With mortgage 10,853 47.1 59.3 7.7
Private rent 2,178 7.9 7.4 2.0
Social rent 6,567 18.5 23.6 21.0
Rent free 404 1.1 1.0 1.6
Total 28,859 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Our calculations based on the FRS 2003–4.
and tax credits are made by applying the take-up proportions estimated for population
sub-groups (Sutherland et al., 2008) on a caseload basis by the Department of Work and
Pensions (2006) and HM Revenue and Customs (2006).1
We use the modified OECD equivalence scale adjusting BHC, AHC and IR incomes
to account for differences in household size and composition. As in the HBAI analysis,
we set the poverty line at 60 per cent of median household equivalised income. This
threshold naturally varies with the income measure that is used.
In the following analysis, we focus on poverty risk for children (aged under sixteen, or
under nineteen if in full-time secondary education and unmarried) and pensioners (men
aged sixty-five or more and women aged sixty or more).
As shown in Table 1, there are significant differences in the distribution of tenure
types for children and pensioners, which we would expect. While about two thirds of
pensioners own outright, less than one in ten children live in owned-outright housing.
About 60 per cent of children live in housing with a mortgage, but less than 8 per cent of
pensioners are in this position. A very low proportion of pensioners are private tenants,
while about 7 per cent of children live in private rental accommodation. The shares of
children and pensioners living in social housing are comparable at slightly over 20 per
cent.2 These patterns suggest that households with pensioners are, on average, likely to
incur lower housing costs than households with children and, other things being equal,
are likely to enjoy greater command over resources for given housing quality than is
indicated by conventional measures of income.
Imput ing ren ts
This section outlines our methodological approach to estimating the value of net IR, which
we add to BHC income to obtain the IR income measure.
Among the methods previously used to derive a measure of IR, some are based on the
capital value of the owned accommodation, viewing IR as a return on capital investment
(Eurostat, 2010). However, this approach requires information about the capital value of
property from all households, including tenants who may not know or supply it. This
is problematic as we are keen to ensure that we assign an imputed rent to all potential
beneficiaries, not least social tenants. Moreover, our interest lies in the consumption
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Table 2 Estimated weekly imputed rent (£) by tenure type and demographic group
Gross IR Net IR
Population Population Children Pensioners
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Own outright 140.2 59.7 126.1 57.7 137.3 68.0 122.3 54.6
Own with mortgage 137.7 55.0 67.6 53.0 66.2 52.1 88.6 62.7
Social rent 107.1 42.9 46.9 39.2 50.6 41.9 42.8 31.2
Rent free 129.8 65.3 129.3 65.2 132.2 68.1 123.7 57.7
All types 132.1 55.8 74.1 61.7 64.6 57.8 100.6 61.8
Source: Our calculations using FRS 2003–4.
value of housing at a given point in time and not its investment return value. Therefore,
we derive IR using the cost-to-quality relationship observed in the private rental market
and based on housing quality-related characteristics observed across all tenure types. IR
then reflects what the occupants of a dwelling would need to pay in gross rent if renting
in the private market, minus what they actually pay to live there.
We first estimate a regression on the rent paid by private tenants, using a set
of accommodation characteristics observable across all tenure types as explanatory
variables. These include the number of bedrooms, the Council Tax band, dummies for the
presence of central heating and whether the accommodation is let furnished or not, the
number of years the household has been occupying the property and the region where
the property is located.3
The estimation sample contains 1,145 private tenants, holding assured short-hold
letting agreements (approximately half of private tenants, which constitute the 8 per cent
of the population). These are most representative of the private rental market prices that we
wish to capture. Other tenancy types may relate to non-market agreements or contracts
that were entered into some time in the past.4 Regression results are presented in the
Appendix.
Then we use estimated parameters from the regression analysis to predict a gross
rent for owner-occupied, socially rented and rent-free accommodation, given the quality-
related characteristics of the accommodation. We then deduct housing costs to obtain net
IR. Housing costs include rent actually paid by reduced rent tenants, mortgage interest
repayments for home owners with a mortgage, other costs related to regular maintenance
and structural insurance and other charges paid by home owners. In some cases (around
5 per cent of home owners repaying a mortgage and about 3 per cent of social tenants),
deducting housing costs results in a negative value of IR, implying that the cost of housing
consumption outweighs any benefit that can be imputed to it, reducing IR income to
below the BHC level.
Table 2 presents our estimates of weekly gross and net IR by tenure type for children
and pensioners, and for the population as a whole. Net IR is significantly lower than gross
IR for owners with a mortgage and social tenants who are the tenure types with relatively
large average housing costs.
Among children and pensioners, outright owners and people living rent free have the
highest amounts of net IR (£126.10 and £129.30 per week respectively in 2003–4 prices),
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Table 3 Child and pensioner poverty rates by tenure type (per cent)
Child poverty Pensioner poverty
BHC AHC IR BHC AHC IR
Own outright 22.0 18.4 14.8 27.5 22.2 3.7
Mortgage 11.9 14.1 11.5 16.1 17.2 7.3
Private tenants 17.6 54.8 36.8 10.9 38.9 17.7
Social tenants 40.8 63.3 45.0 10.3 44.3 9.1
Rent free 28.3 25.1 15.1 36.4 26.0 3.5
All 20.2 29.2 21.6 22.8 26.9 5.4
Source: Our calculations using POLIMOD with FRS 2003–4.
followed by owners with a mortgage (£67.60) and social tenants (£46.90). Generally, the
level of IR within tenure type is similar for children and pensioners. However, average IR
for pensioners who own outright or social tenants is lower than for households of the
same tenure type in which children live, possibly reflecting lower quality or smaller size
of housing in which pensioners live. The reverse is the case for owners with a mortgage,
reflecting pensioners’ later stage in the repayment of their mortgage.
In the final step, we derive the IR income measure by adding net IR to the standard
BHC income measure.
Resu l ts : pover ty us ing a l te r na t i ve income concepts
We now consider the effect of the choice of income measure on poverty rates.5 Table 3
reports poverty rates calculated using the BHC, AHC and IR income measures for children
and pensioners across tenure types.
The two official measures (BHC and AHC) provide different indications of the
prevalence of child poverty. According to the BHC measure, 20 per cent of children live
in households with income below the poverty line, with poor children over-represented
among social tenants. On an AHC basis, the proportion of children living in poverty
is higher by almost half of its BHC value at 29 per cent, and poor children are over-
represented in privately rented accommodation as well as social housing. With the IR
measure, the child poverty rate lies between that of the BHC and AHC measures (22 per
cent). Children in owned-outright housing have a lower poverty risk using the IR measure
than under either the BHC or AHC measures (15 per cent compared with 22 and 18 per
cent respectively), while children in housing owned with a mortgage are shown to have
a similar risk when using the IR and BHC income measures. However, children in social
and private rented accommodation have an IR poverty risk that is higher than that using
BHC income, but lower than that using AHC income.
It may at first sight be surprising that the child poverty risk among private tenants
differs under the IR measure compared with BHC income as no IR has been added to the
income of these households. However, the poverty threshold, measured as 60 per cent
of median income, is 19 per cent higher under the IR measure than using BHC income.
While the incomes of private tenant households are not affected by the shift from BHC to
IR, their incomes relative to the median have fallen.
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Figure 1. Income distribution and poverty thresholds using alternative income concepts
Source: Our calculations using POLIMOD with FRS 2003–4.
The relationship between poverty thresholds and distributions of the three income
measures is shown separately for children and pensioners in Figure 1. For children, both
the threshold and the distribution move to the right with the addition of IR, leaving the IR
poverty rate little different from that under the BHCmeasure. In contrast, the concentration
of pensioners below the poverty line observed for BHC as well as AHC income measures
disappears for the IR measure. As a consequence, pensioner poverty risk is strikingly lower
at one quarter of its BHC value. Poverty risk is especially reduced for home owners and
rent free tenants. As with children, the small group of private tenant pensioners appear at
a higher risk of poverty under the IR measure.
The main reason for such different outcomes for pensioners and children lies in their
tenure status. Pensioners mostly own outright and are therefore attributed with a large
amount of net IR. In contrast, children mostly live either in housing with a mortgage or in
social housing.
Are re fo rm eva lua t ions sens i t i ve to the income measure used?
In this section, we assess the extent to which conclusions about illustrative policy reforms
are sensitive to the choice of income measure used to evaluate the effect on poverty.
We simulate two reforms to the UK tax and benefit system designed to reduce child and
pensioner poverty respectively. Thus, we can, in a stylised manner, consider which reform
provides better value in terms of its poverty-reducing implications and then consider
whether the choice of the income measure affects this assessment.
The reform intended to reduce child poverty is an increase of £12 per week to the
child tax credit (CTC) per-child maximum amount. Using the POLIMODmicrosimulation
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Table 4 Gainers (per cent) and the average increase in household income
(£/week) for children and pensioners following an increase in child tax
credit (for children) and pension credit (for pensioners)
Children (CTC reform) Pensioners (PC reform)
per cent gainers
All tenure types 50.4 44.0
Own outright 50.6 34.3
Mortgage 34.1 41.3
Private tenants 70.6 66.1
Social tenants 84.7 72.6
Rent free 62.2 65.3
Average gain among
gainers (std. dev.)
£12.11 (4.40) £15.33 (8.39)
Source: Our calculations using POLIMOD with FRS 2003–4.
model, we estimate the first round net budgetary cost to the government as being £3.8
billion a year.6
The reform intended to reduce pensioner poverty is designed to cost the same amount.
It consists of an increase in the means-tested pension credit (PC). The simulated reform
adds an extra 18.7 per cent to the guarantee maximum (equivalent to £19.05 per week
for single pensioners and £28.45 for pensioner couples).7
Table 4 reports the number of children and pensioners who gain from the simulated
CTC and PC reforms, respectively, across tenure type, and the average income increase
across benefitting households. About 44 per cent of all pensioners and 50 per cent of all
children would gain from these policies. The average increase in household income per
gaining pensioner would be £15.33 per week, which is slightly larger than the average
increase in household income of £12.11 per gaining child.8 In both groups, people in
private and social rented accommodation are more likely to gain. These tenure types are
more likely occupied by people entitled to means-tested benefits.
The effectiveness of the reforms in reducing child and pensioner poverty using the
three incomemeasures is shown in Table 5. The number of children brought out of poverty
is almost the same in the three cases (830–850 thousand or around 6.4 per cent of all
children). The tenure composition of those brought out of poverty is somewhat different
when comparing the BHC with IR measure, however. While the largest group brought
out of poverty is clearly social tenants using all measures, using IR there are fewer social
tenants and more private tenants and outright owners.
In contrast, the assessment of the poverty-reduction effect of the PC reform on
pensioners is very sensitive to the choice of the income measure. The number of
pensioners brought out of poverty is much lower using the IRmeasure. This is because pre-
reform pensioner poverty using IR is already very low and the proportional effect, while
similar to that under BHC, represents a small number of pensioners (146 thousand, a third
of the number brought out of poverty under the BHCmeasure). The contrast with the AHC
measure is even larger because pre-reform AHC pensioner poverty is much higher. This
suggests that the reform is very effective, moving more than half of the number counted as
poor on this basis across the poverty line. The tenure composition of pensioners brought
out of poverty also shifts significantly, with fewer outright owners and more social tenants.
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Table 5 Child and pensioner poverty reduction due to policy reforms, under
alternative income concepts and by tenure type
Children Pensioners
BHC AHC IR BHC AHC IR
Poverty rate BEFORE 20.2 29.2 21.6 22.8 26.9 5.4
Poverty rate AFTER 13.8 22.8 15.1 18.1 12.1 4.2
Reduction (ppts) 6.4 6.4 6.5 4.7 14.8 1.3
Number leaving poverty 832,000 834,000 845,000 517,000 1,577,000 146,000
Tenure composition of those brought out of poverty (per cent)
Outright owners 3.0 6.6 4.8 75.7 53.0 42.2
Own with mortgage 20.2 20.8 19.4 7.6 3.9 9.7
Private tenants 6.8 11.1 10.0 1.8 2.8 3.7
Social tenants 69.7 60.8 65.1 12.9 38.7 42.1
Rent free 0.3 0.6 0.8 2.3 1.6 2.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Our calculations using POLIMOD with FRS 2003–4.
On the basis of the evidence presented here, judgement as to whether expenditure
on child or pensioner benefits is more effective at reducing poverty among the respective
group depends on the income concept used. On a BHC basis, the numbers are relatively
close, with child poverty reduced to a greater extent than pensioner poverty. On an
AHC basis, the reform to PC would be extremely effective at moving pensioners across
the poverty line. About twice as many pensioners would be brought out of poverty
as children under the budget-equivalent CTC reform. Under the IR measure, pensioner
poverty is much lower before the reform and the reform itself has a relatively small
absolute effect on the poverty numbers. However, using the IR income measure suggests
that expenditure on children would be the more effective strategy.
Conc lus ions
The treatment of housing when measuring income has some important implications for
poverty analysis, and for drawing conclusions about the poverty-reduction effects of policy
reforms. In this article, we compare poverty estimates for the UK under actual policies
and under illustrative policy reform scenarios, using conventional BHC and AHC income
measures and using an alternative IR approach. Adopting the IR measure can potentially
provide a more comprehensive and consistent picture of living standards and therefore
improve judgements about the success of policy reforms in terms of their implications for
poverty or income distribution generally.
Once we account for the market value of housing quality, net of housing costs, child
poverty risk is not significantly different from that estimated using the official BHC income
measure. However, the composition of children counted as poor is different, including
more children living in privately rented accommodation and fewer from owned outright
housing. In contrast, pensioner poverty risk would fall to 5 per cent (one quarter its BHC
value) using the IR measure.
Measures of the success of policy reforms in tackling poverty, such as the absolute
reduction in the numbers counted as poor, are almost unaffected by the choice of income
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measure in the case of children and an increase in CTC. In contrast, the effect varies for
pensioners and a budgetary-equivalent increase in PC, depending on the chosen income
measure. It is smallest for the IR measure because pensioner poverty is already low using
this income measure.
One can argue about whether IR should be included as income for poverty measure-
ment. On the one hand, including IR allows better comparisons between incomes across
tenure types. It captures the fact that some households, such as those owning outright, pay
little for housing out of cash incomewhich is not the case for BHC income. Simultaneously,
the IR measure overcomes drawbacks of the AHC measure, which conceals the effect on
relative living standards of households living in higher quality housing.
On the other hand, including IR as standard in poverty measurement would pose
challenges. In practice, it would require a better assessment of the costs of ownership
than has been possible in this study. For example, although we have deducted from IR
amounts recorded in the FRS data for regular maintenance costs, we have not been able
to account either for irregular maintenance costs or the hidden costs of living in housing
that is in need of repair, but which the owners are unable to maintain. To correct for this,
aspects of housing quality that are not captured by the variables available to us would
need to be included in the estimation of net IR.
A further issue relates to the non-cash nature of imputed rent. The inclusion of imputed
rent (and other non-cash incomes) has been advocated in distributional and poverty
analysis on the grounds that such income components enlarge individuals’ command over
resources. However, although the availability of a positive amount of IR frees cash incomes
that would otherwise have been spent on housing consumption, non-cash incomes cannot
be regarded as perfect substitutes for cash incomes, especially in the short term.
Nevertheless, we demonstrate that the inclusion of IR would reduce the assessed risk
of poverty for pensioners as a whole relative to children as a whole. This re-emphasises the
already high-profile policy problem of child poverty in the UK which remains insensitive
to the treatment of housing income that we have considered here.
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Notes
1 Where ranges of take-up proportions are published, the mid point is used.
2 Note that the ‘social rent’ category mainly includes those living in accommodation rented from
Local Authorities or Housing Associations but also includes a few cases (3 per cent of the group) renting
from an employer or a family member.
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3 Descriptive statistics for the relevant covariates, by tenure type, are available from the authors on
request.
4 As a robustness check, the estimation was repeated on the whole sample of private tenants and
also on ‘trimmed‘ samples where a percentage of top and bottom rent value cases were excluded. Most
coefficients were significant and comparable in size across the four estimation samples. Despite the
reduced sample size, the estimation carried out on the assured short hold agreements sample exhibited
the highest R square.
5 Similar results are found for indicators of the poverty gap and poverty intensity.
6 This estimate allows for some non take-up of entitlements to CTC. For example, caseload take-up
for working families of CTC and WTC was 91 per cent for lone parents and 73 per cent for couples in
2003 (HMRC, 2006).
7 Allowing for non take-up of PC between 63 per cent and 73 per cent (DWP, 2006).
8 The difference is simply a function of the extra spending being somewhat more concentrated
among fewer pensioners. There were 23 per cent more children than pensioners living in UK households
in 2003.
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Appendix
Estimating log rent for assured shorthold tenants
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. err.
Two bedrooms 0.162∗∗∗ [0.031]
Three bedrooms 0.213∗∗∗ [0.035]
Four or more bedrooms 0.350∗∗∗ [0.055]
Central heating 0.098∗∗∗ [0.034]
Council tax band B 0.129∗∗∗ [0.033]
Council tax band C 0.260∗∗∗ [0.037]
Council tax band D 0.355∗∗∗ [0.043]
Council tax band E 0.444∗∗∗ [0.061]
Council tax band F 0.589∗∗∗ [0.075]
Council tax band G–H 0.868∗∗∗ [0.106]
Council tax band: not valued separately −0.261∗∗∗ [0.068]
North West 0.141∗ [0.081]
Yorkshire 0.131 [0.081]
East Midland 0.141∗ [0.084]
West Midland 0.039 [0.082]
East 0.307∗∗∗ [0.080]
South East 0.383∗∗∗ [0.078]
South West 0.253∗∗∗ [0.080]
Wales −0.041 [0.089]
Scotland −0.023 [0.079]
Northern Ireland −0.145 [0.127]
Inner London 0.687∗∗∗ [0.085]
Outer London 0.571∗∗∗ [0.083]
Lived at address for 2 to 10 years −0.119∗∗∗ [0.025]
Lived at address for more than 10 years −0.569∗∗∗ [0.045]
Property rented furnished 0.083∗∗∗ [0.028]
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Continued
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. err.
Constant 4.031∗∗∗ [0.081]
Observations 1,145
R-squared 0.540
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; ∗ significant at 10 per cent ; ∗∗ significant at 5 per
cent ; ∗∗∗ significant at 1 per cent
Source: Our calculations using FRS 2003–4.
Estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage increase in gross rent
that would result from a change in the value of each covariate from the situation of a
‘reference accommodation’, other things being equal. The reference accommodation is a
one bedroom house, unfurnished, in Council Tax band A, with no central heating, located
in the North East of England and in which the household has been living for less than two
years. So the market rent is 16.2 per cent higher for two bedroom houses and respectively
21.3 per cent and 35.0 per cent higher for three and four or more bedroom houses,
compared with one bedroom houses. Central heating increases rent by one tenth and
furniture by about 8 per cent. The rent level progressively increases for accommodation
classified in higher Council Tax bands, up to an 87 per cent increase for band G and H
housing, relative to band A accommodation. Location in London increases market rent
by 60 per cent to 70 per cent, and by 25 per cent to 40 per cent in the South East,
South West and East, relative to a location in the North East. Rent is 12 per cent lower
for accommodation occupied for more than two years and about 57 per cent lower for
accommodation occupied for more than ten years. This indicates the extent to which,
in longer tenancies, rent does not keep pace with market increases. For this reason, in
the ‘out of sample’ prediction based on the estimated function, it is assumed that all
(hypothetical) rental agreements were initiated within the last two years. Also, owned
accommodation is treated as being rented unfurnished.
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